en:passport:oroszok_a_gnss_ellen
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| en:passport:oroszok_a_gnss_ellen [2026/07/15 22:16] – Automatic translation vamsan | en:passport:oroszok_a_gnss_ellen [2026/07/16 21:41] (current) – vamsan | ||
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| How would you react if the sat-nav in your car suddenly stopped working? What if the mobile network went down and, all of a sudden, the power cut out too? These are, in fact, the main objectives of one of the tools of Russian hybrid warfare, the **GPS jamming**. If you happen to think this is just an empty threat, I’m afraid I must disabuse you of that notion; the Russians are already testing this capability almost every month. | How would you react if the sat-nav in your car suddenly stopped working? What if the mobile network went down and, all of a sudden, the power cut out too? These are, in fact, the main objectives of one of the tools of Russian hybrid warfare, the **GPS jamming**. If you happen to think this is just an empty threat, I’m afraid I must disabuse you of that notion; the Russians are already testing this capability almost every month. | ||
| - | {{ passport: | + | {{ passport: |
| - | In November 2024 **Professor Todd Humphreys** (// | + | In November 2024, **Professor Todd Humphreys** (// |
| - | The signals from GPS satellites are recorded by several data collection stations worldwide; and there are dozens of such systems operating in Europe too. These simply log the data from visible satellites, and these log files can be retrieved and analysed. Observers have noticed on several occasions that the European GPS signal ‘drops out’ for 2–3 seconds every few weeks //“drops out”//; all European units simultaneously detect a brief disruption in GPS activity. Looking back, 75 such days have been identified since 2019 when this same continent-wide pattern recurred – the effect was felt from Spain to Svalbard. | + | The signals from GPS satellites are recorded by several data collection stations worldwide, and there are dozens of such systems operating in Europe, too. These simply log the data from visible satellites, and these log files can be retrieved and analysed. Observers have noticed on several occasions that the European GPS signal ‘drops out’ for 2–3 seconds every few weeks //“drops out”//; all European units simultaneously detect a brief disruption in GPS activity. Looking back, 75 such days have been identified since 2019, when this same continent-wide pattern recurred – the effect was felt from Spain to Svalbard. |
| [{{ passport: | [{{ passport: | ||
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| ==== How does GPS locate us from outer space? ==== | ==== How does GPS locate us from outer space? ==== | ||
| - | Imagine that the satellites orbiting the Earth are like lighthouses placed in outer space, each fitted with a super-accurate clock **lighthouses**. These satellites continuously broadcast the exact time and their own position to Earth. When our phone receives these radio signals, it calculates how long it took for the signal to reach it based on the speed of light, and from this it works out how far away it is from that particular satellite. If our phone knows the distances to at least four of these ‘space lighthouses’ at the same time – using maths to find the points where the circles intersect – it can determine our exact position on the planet, down to the metre. The more satellites our phone can see and use at the same time, the more the data arriving from different directions | + | Imagine that the satellites orbiting the Earth are like lighthouses placed in outer space, each fitted with a super-accurate clock **lighthouses**. These satellites continuously broadcast the exact time and their own position to Earth. When our phone receives these radio signals, it calculates how long it took for the signal to reach it based on the speed of light, and from this, it works out how far away it is from that particular satellite. If our phone knows the distances to at least four of these ‘space lighthouses’ at the same time – using maths to find the points where the circles intersect – it can determine our exact position on the planet, down to the metre. The more satellites our phone can see and use at the same time, the more the data arriving from different directions |
| ==== What damage would a prolonged GNSS outage cause? ==== | ==== What damage would a prolonged GNSS outage cause? ==== | ||
| - | If, as part of a hybrid military operation, someone were to completely or partially disable the **GNSS** (//GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou//) systems in Europe as part of a hybrid military operation, it would cause an immediate infrastructural and economic collapse, resulting in losses of several billion euros per day. As, according | + | If, as part of a hybrid military operation, someone were to completely or partially disable the **GNSS** (//GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou//) systems in Europe as part of a hybrid military operation, it would cause an immediate infrastructural and economic collapse, resulting in losses of several billion euros per day. According |
| Ports (e.g. Rotterdam, Hamburg) would grind to a halt, as automated container cranes and cargo ships rely on GNSS guidance accurate to the centimetre. Global supply chains would collapse within days. The // | Ports (e.g. Rotterdam, Hamburg) would grind to a halt, as automated container cranes and cargo ships rely on GNSS guidance accurate to the centimetre. Global supply chains would collapse within days. The // | ||
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| ==== The investigation ==== | ==== The investigation ==== | ||
| - | Initially, researchers suspected a ground-based jamming station (such as the military towers in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad) – clearly, from the very outset of the investigation, | + | Initially, researchers suspected a ground-based jamming station (such as the military towers in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad) – clearly, from the very outset of the investigation, |
| In the early stages, the researchers narrowed the list down to 14 geostationary satellites, but the investigation stalled because the stations recording GNSS data did not record the data with sufficient (temporal) accuracy, making it impossible to narrow the field any further. | In the early stages, the researchers narrowed the list down to 14 geostationary satellites, but the investigation stalled because the stations recording GNSS data did not record the data with sufficient (temporal) accuracy, making it impossible to narrow the field any further. | ||
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| ==== What is the actual primary purpose of the EKS/ | ==== What is the actual primary purpose of the EKS/ | ||
| - | The Tundra satellites are equipped with highly sensitive, five-spectrum (including infrared and ultraviolet) | + | The Tundra satellites are equipped with highly sensitive, five-spectrum |
| In addition, the satellites are equipped with a secondary, strictly protected communications payload. The purpose of this is to ensure the transmission of encrypted commands to Russia’s nuclear retaliatory forces in the event of a nuclear war. | In addition, the satellites are equipped with a secondary, strictly protected communications payload. The purpose of this is to ensure the transmission of encrypted commands to Russia’s nuclear retaliatory forces in the event of a nuclear war. | ||
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| * Kosmos 2563 (Tundra 6 – Launch: 2022) – The newest member of the constellation, | * Kosmos 2563 (Tundra 6 – Launch: 2022) – The newest member of the constellation, | ||
| - | Russia originally intended to expand the constellation to 10 units. However, due to Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine (in particular the embargo on high-tech microchips and optical sensors), the Russian space industry is unable to manufacture new Tundra satellites, so the replenishment of the fleet has come to a complete standstill. | + | Russia originally intended to expand the constellation to 10 units. However, due to Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine (in particular, the embargo on high-tech microchips and optical sensors), the Russian space industry is unable to manufacture new Tundra satellites, so the replenishment of the fleet has come to a complete standstill. |
| </ | </ | ||
| - | The members of the constellation are in an extremely elongated, so-called **Molniya orbits** . This specialised elliptical orbit allows the satellites to slow down dramatically over the northern hemisphere and remain there for most of the day, whilst their altitude varies from 1, | + | The members of the constellation are in extremely elongated, so-called **Molniya orbits** . This specialised elliptical orbit allows the satellites to slow down dramatically over the northern hemisphere and remain there for most of the day, whilst their altitude varies from 1, |
| The theoretical minimum altitude of 1,200 kilometres calculated by researchers coincides perfectly with that of **Kosmos 2546’s** , which was causing disruption to the continent whilst situated precisely within this near-Earth window. As the network provides global coverage, the Russians would theoretically be capable of carrying out similar GNSS jamming not only over Europe but even over the United States. | The theoretical minimum altitude of 1,200 kilometres calculated by researchers coincides perfectly with that of **Kosmos 2546’s** , which was causing disruption to the continent whilst situated precisely within this near-Earth window. As the network provides global coverage, the Russians would theoretically be capable of carrying out similar GNSS jamming not only over Europe but even over the United States. | ||
| - | According to the raw data, Kosmos 2546 not only broadcast a powerful signal in the immediate vicinity of the GPS bands (1577.5 MHz) with a powerful signal, | + | According to the raw data, Kosmos 2546 not only broadcast a powerful signal in the immediate vicinity of the GPS band (1577.5 MHz) but also at a lower frequency (1558.5 MHz), which overlaps with the frequency of the Chinese Beidou navigation system. |
| [{{ passport: | [{{ passport: | ||
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| **Richard Bowden**, of the Spanish **GMV** technology giant, confirmed with his own data that in at least three of the 75 documented cases, Russian military satellites were undoubtedly involved. The leading trade journal of the global navigation industry, the [[https:// | **Richard Bowden**, of the Spanish **GMV** technology giant, confirmed with his own data that in at least three of the 75 documented cases, Russian military satellites were undoubtedly involved. The leading trade journal of the global navigation industry, the [[https:// | ||
| - | Of course, anyone expecting an admission from the Russians is in for a long wait, but the sheer volume of data and measurements makes the culprit clear. Experts suggest two main reasons as to why Kosmos 2546 is bombarding the continent with only a few seconds’ worth of frequency-shifted transmissions. On the one hand, this is a capability test (Todd Humphreys’ theory): Russia is testing its space-based electronic warfare system in preparation for a potential armed conflict. The reason they are not transmitting directly on the GPS frequency and are only broadcasting for short periods is so as not to fully reveal | + | Of course, anyone expecting an admission from the Russians is in for a long wait, but the sheer volume of data and measurements makes the culprit clear. Experts suggest two main reasons as to why Kosmos 2546 is bombarding the continent with only a few seconds’ worth of frequency-shifted transmissions. On the one hand, this is a capability test (Todd Humphreys’ theory): Russia is testing its space-based electronic warfare system in preparation for a potential armed conflict. The reason they are not transmitting directly on the GPS frequency and are only broadcasting for short periods is to avoid fully revealing |
| ==== Reactions ==== | ==== Reactions ==== | ||
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| Interestingly, | Interestingly, | ||
| - | Following the intensification of the Russian hybrid threat, the United Kingdom, Norway and several other northern European countries have also begun to rebuild | + | Following the intensification of the Russian hybrid threat, the United Kingdom, Norway, and several other northern European countries have also begun rebuilding |
| - | Modern passenger aircraft no longer rely solely on GNSS. Ring laser gyroscopes (**RLG** – //Ring Laser Gyroscope// | + | Modern passenger aircraft no longer rely solely on GNSS. Ring laser gyroscopes (**RLG** – //Ring Laser Gyroscope// |
| In the vicinity of airports, the EU maintains and develops traditional, | In the vicinity of airports, the EU maintains and develops traditional, | ||
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| Once mass production of the miniature antennas and integrated chips developed by ESA and Roke begins, they could be incorporated into the navigation systems of premium cars and, eventually, into top-of-the-range smartphones as a secondary line of defence. | Once mass production of the miniature antennas and integrated chips developed by ESA and Roke begins, they could be incorporated into the navigation systems of premium cars and, eventually, into top-of-the-range smartphones as a secondary line of defence. | ||
| - | {{page> | + | {{page>en:passport: |
| - | {{page> | + | {{page>en:passport: |
| ===== Sources ===== | ===== Sources ===== | ||
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| Public tracking data for Russia’s early missile defence warning system (EKS) and the Tundra constellation orbiting in the Molniya orbit: [[https:// | Public tracking data for Russia’s early missile defence warning system (EKS) and the Tundra constellation orbiting in the Molniya orbit: [[https:// | ||
| - | + | {{tag> | |
| - | ===== Recommended ===== | + | |
| - | Similar posts can be found on the **‘Interesting Stories’** section: {{topic> | + | |
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| - | {{tag> | + | |
| ~~NOCACHE~~ | ~~NOCACHE~~ | ||
| - | Number of post views: {{passport:counter|total}} | + | Number of post views: {{counter|total}} |
en/passport/oroszok_a_gnss_ellen.txt · Last modified: by vamsan
